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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Your recent discussion of "In-Plant Strategies" (LRR 7, Fall 1985) is of vital importance for the 
labor movement. I would like to raise several issues for discussion. 
Both Tom Balanoff (B), in "The Cement Workers' Experience" and Jack Metzgar (M), in "Running the Plant 
Backwards," assume that a return to the status quo—or the pre-Reagan period—of collective bargaining is 
desirable. That might be true, but neither B nor M discusses the content of the status quo nor takes it into 
account when assessing in-plant strategies. 
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Follow-Up: 
New Tactics for Labor 
In-Plant Stategies & 
"The Social Contract" 
• Steven Rosswurm 
Dear Labor Research Review, 
Your recent discussion of "In-Plant Strategies" (LRR 7, Fall 1985) 
is of vital importance for the labor movement. I would like to raise 
several issues for discussion. 
Both Tom Balanoff (B), in "The Cement Workers' Experience" 
and Jack Metzgar (M), in "Running the Plant Backwards," assume 
that a return to the status quo—or the pre-Reagan period—of 
collective bargaining is desirable. That might be true, but neither 
B nor M discusses the content of the status quo nor takes it into 
account when assessing in-plant strategies. 
A restoration of the status quo means a return to the pattern 
of collective bargaining that the "social contract" ushered in. The 
"social contract" (used to describe the relationship between trade 
unions and capital that developed from 1947/1948) consisted of 
quid-pro-quos: Organized labor received continually increasing 
wages and benefits and a recognition of its right to bargain. In 
exchange, capital received a recognition of its right to manage, a 
commitment to provide something approaching uninterrupted 
production, and the expulsion of dissidents (mainly, but certainly 
not entirely, Communists or those who would work with 
Communists) from its ranks. 
The meaning of the social contract, once considered the bulwark 
of "sensible" American labor relations, is now contested terrain. 
I will focus here on those aspects germane to in-plant strategies. 
One of capital's key demands in the postwar period was its 
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recognition of the right to 
run the shopfloor. This 
right to manage, eroded 
during the CIO organizing 
period, increasingly came 
under fire during World 
War II and immediately 
after. Using a wide variety 
of weapons—including 
the infamous Taft-Hartley 
Act, an ideological offen-
sive, and the trade union 
leadership's ambivalence 
about shopfloor activity-
capital extracted from 
organized labor a recogni-
tion of its right to run its 
"own" affairs. 
A necessary corollary to capital's right to manage was the trade 
union leadership's increased policing of its members' activity on 
the shopfloor. The leadership disciplined the membership when 
it acted on its own in the workplace—when it disrupted orderly 
production—because this activity not only violated contract 
provisions, but also made it difficult to negotiate centralized 
contracts. Trade unions increasingly looked to the "workplace rule 
of law" to defend their membership's rights. An increasingly 
legalistic and formalistic grievance procedure became the avenue 
of defense. 
Collective bargaining in the automobile industry provides points 
of illustration. Forced for a variety of reasons to retreat from the 
anti-capitalist goals of the 1946 GM strike, Walter Reuther took 
the lead in creating the social contract. In 1948 the UAW accepted 
"two pillars of the postwar social order": the COLA and an "annual 
improvement factor" keyed to GM's increased productivity. In 
1950, GM offered even more; Reuther accepted. Fortune called 
the 1950 contract the "Treaty of Detroit" because even though 
GM may have paid a "billion for peace . . . it got a bargain. General 
Motors has regained control over one of the crucial management 
functions. . . long range scheduling of production, model changes, 
and tool and plant investment." 
Reuther's bargaining produced considerable material gains, but 
at a price: Those who fought against speed-ups and layoffs at the 
shopfloor level were disciplined. Those who did not accept the 
parameters of the social contract were isolated and silenced (if 
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necessary). The UAW International Executive Board (IEB), for 
example, placed an administrator over DeSoto Local 227 in 1951 
because unauthorized work stoppages had closed the plant for 80 
working days; 227's leadership had refused to discipline the 
leaders of those walkouts. In 1952 the IEB placed an administratorship 
over River Rouge 600. Ostensibly prompted by "Communist 
domination," this step actually was taken to force acceptance of 
the social contract and Reuther's commitment to it. As an observor 
noted about the 1950 GM contract: "This kind of collective 
bargaining calls for intelligent trading rather than table-pounding, 
for diplomacy rather than belligerency, and for internal union 
discipline rather than grass roots rank-and-file activity." 
"Grass roots rank-and-file activity'—there is the rub. From the 
available evidence, one of the most profound impacts of the social 
contract was the delegitimization of shopfloor activity. Of course, 
it never went away entirely; but it no longer was "acceptable" trade 
union behavior nor a primary working-class weapon. 
Another result of the social contract appears to have been the 
development of the membership's alienation from their locals. By 
the 1960s, according to two membership surveys, two-thirds of 
all UAW members overwhelmingly "held a favorable impression" 
of the International, but only 26% in 1961 and 16% in 1967 
thought their committeeman was a "stand up guy who protects 
the workers." 
Given this perspective, it is not surprising that the Introduction 
to LRR 7 notes, "in-plant strategies require the virtual rebuilding 
of local unions from the ground up." Nor is it surprising that B 
argues that one of the problems with an in-plant strategy is 
"convincing workers that they do have power in the plant." It is 
not surprising that B suggests that "in-plant strategies involve 
terrain unfamiliar to most unionists." 
What is surprising, however, given LRR's goals, is that neither 
B nor M suggests—even tentatively—the relationship between the 
social contract and the need to re-activate the membership. It is 
surprising, moreover, that neither draws any connection between 
the social contract and the current problems facing the labor 
movement. Instead B and M assume that the objective of an 
in-plant strategy ought to be to re-institute the workplace rule of 
law and, in M's words, "orderly procedures for processing 
grievances." 
The issue is not the contract per se, but rather how it is enforced. 
The issue is not the grievance procedure, but rather how the local 
polices it. As a Buffalo union representative said in 1961: "When 
the men settled things on the shopfloor, it was something they 
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did themselves. They directly participated in determining their 
working conditions. When things are settled legalistically, through 
the grievance procedure, it's something foreign. They don't see 
it." Prior to the social contract, many unions worked with a 
contract and a grievance system and had an active shopfloor 
presence. 
The supreme irony of both pieces is that B and M advocate a 
strategy that requires activation of union members—only to return 
them to the workplace rule of law, to a new state of passivity upon 
victory. 
This is not a defense of militance for the sake of militance. It 
is not a veiled Wobbly attack on contracts. It is rather an attempt 
to open up a debate on the relationship between activity on the 
shopfloor and an energized membership with wider union and 
working-class goals. It is, furthermore, an implicit effort to suggest 
the relevance of history. One of the central weapons in our struggle 
to reclaim America must be our history. Without a living presence 
of the lessons derived from years of working-class struggle for 
dignity and justice, we are disarmed. • 
Balanoff & Metzgar Reply: 
We appreciate Steve Ross worm's thoughtful historical essay in 
reply to our articles on in-plant strategies in LRR #7, and we agree 
about the relevance of post-war labor history for understanding 
the context of current problems. 
But neither of us in any way implied that in-plant strategies have 
as their goal "only to return. . .to the workplace rule of law, to 
a new state of passivity." We do think, however, that it is vital to 
preserve the system of legal rights built up (at a substantial price, 
as Steve says) by decades of union struggle (including on the 
shopfloor). 
The "social contract" which Rosswurm finds so onerous is now 
under attack. Labor did not look for this fight, but it cannot avoid 
it. Right now, labor does not have a unified offensive strategy for 
combatting its enemies, but what our articles suggest is that 
whatever defensive efforts unions can mount must be based on 
"activating the membership." While basically defensive measures 
aimed at restoring a previous status quo, in-plant strategies provide 
concrete nuts-and-bolts ways for unleashing and organizing the 
ingenuity, creativity and fighting spirit of union workers. 
If this is done effectively, through in-plant strategies and other 
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If this is done effectively, through in-plant strategies and other 
"new tactics" as well as some old ones, there is no reason why 
unions should stop at merely preserving the previous social 
contract. Right now labor has its back to the wall, but we genuinely 
believe that management and its bought-and-paid-for politicians 
are going to regret having put us there. In-plant strategies and other 
tactics which cultivate membership activism can build toward a 
renewal of the labor movement. There is no "original sin" that 
restricts us from doing that. • 
An Important New Labor Film 
"TIGER BY THE TAIL" 
The Story of the Movement to Keep GM Van Nuys Open 
Directed by Michael Goldman 
Written by Eric Mann Narrated by Edward Asner 
All of us have faced demands for concessions, but never is the pressure greater 
than when the company is serious about possibly closing the plant and the 
union knows the threat is real. At GM Van Nuys, California's last U.S. auto 
plant, UAW Local 645 is building a movement to put counter-pressure on 
GM—threatening a boycott of GM products in Southern California, the largest 
new car market in the country, if they ever close our plant. We are using 
organized petition drives, rallies, marches and media publicity to pressure 
GM to make a long-term commitment to keep our plant open. Tiger by the 
Tail tells the story of our struggle. For more information, contact: 
Labor/Community Coalition to Keep GM Van Nuys Open 
6151 Van Nuys Blvd., Van Nuys, CA 91401 (213) 931-9888 
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